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INSANITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA
Herbert Hovenkamp *
I. INTRODUCTION
The guilt or innocence of an individual accused of a crime
depends upon whether he was responsible for the crime committed.
But to find a person guilty of a crime, the law looks beyond the fact
that he committed the acts constituting the crime. It also ascertains
whether that person was criminally responsible. Determining the
criminal responsibility of an individual is far from a precise science.
While the law may decide that an individual is sane and thereby
responsible for his acts, psychology might say otherwise.
Psychology and psychiatry, the two sciences of human
responsibility, came of age and began to challenge the law's
longheld theories during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era.
The developing conflicts between psychology and the law
during this period are illustrated in the case of People v. Willard.
*Herbert Hovenkamp, B.A., Calvin College, 1969: M.A., 1971: Ph.D.. 1976: JI.D.,
Universitv of Texas, 1978. Associate Profiessor of Law, Hastings Colle1e of the Law. University (1f
California. Previous writing: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN AMFRICA, 1800-1860 (Univ. of Pennsylvania
Press. 1978).
1. 150 Cal. 543, 89 P. 124(1907).
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Frank Willard was a chronic alcoholic who had twice been
committed to the Mendocino State Hospital for the Insane. After
his latest release from that institution, Willard was telling people
that he had been hired by President Theodore Roosevelt and others
to arrest and punish evil-doers. Willard had threatened to kill
anyone who interfered with his mission. 2
Upon hearing of Willard's actions, the sheriff of Mendocino
County, California, J. H. Smith, questioned him about his
behavior, since Willard was known to have a propensity for
violence. 3 After questioning Willard, Sheriff Smith petitioned the
superior court to have Willard committed to the state hospital
again, alleging that he was insane and could be dangerous.4
At the commitment hearing two psychiatrists testified that
Willard was homicidal and dangerous and suffering from an insane
delusion. Furthermore, they stated that no one could predict how
Willard might act and that he had told them that he would kill
anyone who tried to interfere with his mission. 5
The judge gave his commitment order from the bench. He
determined that Willard was insane and a dangerous menace to
society. Willard had to be committed to the state mental hospital. 6
Just as the judge was signing the commitment order Willard
jumped from his chair and shouted that he would not return to the
mental hospital. He bolted from the courtroom, Sheriff Smith
pursuing. Willard turned abruptly and pulled a pistol from his
pocket. The sheriff had carelessly forgotten to search Willard. In
the presence of the judge, the experts, and the other witnesses,
Willard shot Sheriff Smith, who died almost immediately. Frank
Willard was arrested and held for first degree murder . 7
At Willard's trial, his lawyer raised his only and obvious
defense: Willard was insane. At the time his client shot Sheriff
Smith, he had been so mentally defective that he was not
responsible for his actions .8
The jury heard the evidence of Willard's insanity, but it also
heard the trial judge's closing instructions about California's
insanity defense. The judge stated that in order to acquit the
defendant the jury must be convinced that when the act was
committed, the defendant was so deranged and diseased mentally
2. People v. W%'illard, 150 Cal. 543. 555. 89 P. 124, 129 (1907).
3. Id. at 546, 89 P. at 125.
4. Id. at 546, 89 P. at 126.
5. Id. at 555, 89 P. at 129.
6. Id. at 546, 89 P. at 126.
7. Id. at 547, 89 P. at 126.
8. Id
542
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that he was not conscious of the wrongful nature of the act. 9 If he
had reasoning capacity sufficient to distinguish between right and
wrong as to the particular act he was doing, he must be held
responsible for his conduct. 10
The jury had heard much evidence that Frank Willard was not
who he thought he was and suffered from serious delusions. But it
had not heard that Willard did not know that murder was wrong,
and no one had testified that Willard did not know what he was
doing when he drew his pistol and fired at Sheriff Smith. On the
contrary, except for his fantastic story about his appointed
mission,11 Willard appeared to be quite coherent, and he knew
exactly what had happened on the day the sheriff died. The jury
convicted Willard of murder and the judge sentenced him to die. 12
Willard's attorney argued on appeal that the jury verdict had
been contrary to the great weight of the evidence of Frank Willard's
insanity.13 Here was a case of insanity if ever there was one, he
pleaded: a defendant who committed his crime at the very moment
the judge was signing his commitment order. Here was a man
psychiatrists knew would be dangerous if he were permitted to
remain at large.
The California Supreme Court agreed that Frank Willard was
insane. However, it held that the test for the insanity defense in
criminal cases was rather specific, and a defendant who knew that
he was doing something wrong clearly failed it. Furthermore, the
court found that even though a person may be partially insane, as
for instance, suffering from some insane delusions or
hallucinations, he must nevertheless be held responsible "if he
understands the nature and character of his action and its
consequences .... ",14 The court repeated a century-old judicial
doctrine about insanity:
There are many kinds and degrees of insanity, and it is
not every kind or degree which will relieve a person from
such responsibility, and the degree of mental impairment
which would authorize his confinement in an asylum for
the insane may be entirely different from the degree of
mental derangement which will relieve him from
9. Id. at 554, 89 P. at 129.
10. Id.
11. id. at 555. 89 P. at 129.
12. Id. at 547. 89 P. at 126.
13. Id. at 553, 89 P. at 128. The court lound that premeditation, a necessary requirement for the
death penalty in California. was a reasonalle conclusion from the evidence, because Sheriff Smith
had been responsible for Frank Willard's two previous commitments to the State Hospital. Id.
14. Id. at 554, 89 P. at 129.
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responsibility for his criminal acts. A person may be
partially insane, or be insane upon one or several
subjects, and for that reason be a proper person for
confinement in a state insane asylum . . . and yet at the
same time such person may be perfectly sane upon all
other subjects and entirely responsible under the law for a
criminal act committed by him. 15
On June 14, 1907, Frank Willard was executed at San
Quentin Prison.
The case of Frank Willard reveals a tension between
psychiatry and the law that had been developing for some time. By
the end of the nineteenth century psychologists and psychiatrists
had become confident that there were no limits to the ability of the
mental sciences to explain human behavior. Mental diseases, they
believed, were well on their way to being diagnosed and classified
as easily as physicians had learned to classify and explain physical
diseases. The positivism of the Progressive Era was as strong in
psychiatry as everywhere else.
The law, however, had gotten lost somewhere almost a
century before. Criminal judges still used a legal test for insanity
predicated on the notion that the human mind was dark and
mysterious. The legal insanity test had been invented at a time
when people believed the mind was each person's link with God or
the supernatural. In fact, the legal test that Frank Willard failed
was well over one hundred years old in 1907, although it had been
standardized and named in M'Naghten's Case in 1843.16
II. THE M'NAGHTEN RULE
Daniel M'Naghten had suffered from delusions quite similar
to Frank Willard's. M'Naghten believed that just about everyone
was out to get him. While under the influence of one of those
delusions, he shot and killed the private secretary of Sir Robert
Peel, England's Tory Prime Minister. 17 The justices of the English
Court of Common Pleas acquitted M'Naghten because of his
insanity. Queen Victoria was outraged and public opinion ran
heavily against the verdict. The House of Lords entered a long
debate about the standards for acquittal in such cases, and it finally
15. id. at 553-54, 89 P. at 128-29.
16. M'Naghten's Case. 8 Eng. Rep. 718(1843).
17. Id
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asked the justices for a set of written answers to four questions
about the insanity defense. The published answers, which reflected
and clarified the existing law of insanity, became the basis for the
M'Naghten insanity rule.18
The new rule consisted of two parts. If someone was partially
insane - that is, if he had delusions about a limited area of his
experience but was mentally healthy in other ways - then he could
be acquitted by reason of insanity only if he could show two things:
that he did not know that the act he committed was morally wrong,
and that he did not know it was against the law. However, even the
partially insane person who believed that his criminal act was
producing some public benefit was held responsible under the
M'Naghten rules "if he knew at the time of committing such crime
that he was acting contrary to . . . the law of the land." 19 On the
other hand, if someone was completely insane, the test was whether
"at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong." 20 The justices located legal insanity in the defendant's
inability to have a certain abstract but commonly held notion of
right and wrong. Sane defendants and sane jurors were presumed
to have those ideas deeply rooted in their souls. What was wrong,
was wrong. People who did not recognize wrong when they saw it
simply did not have all their faculties.
The answers of the justices did not create a clear legal test. The
justices were not deciding M'Naghten's guilt when they wrote
them, since they had already issued their verdict. 21 Instead, their
answers were based on rather abstract questions about the kinds of
mental disorders that would relieve someone from criminal
responsibility. As a result, some of the justices' conclusions were
very broad while others were extremely narrow. For the next
century judges would be modifying and clarifying them.
The M'Naghten rules were a clear product of British thought in
the 1840s. First, they were thoroughly Christian, more Protestant
than Catholic. Second, they were closely tied to the retributive
18. Id. The debates of the House of Lords are recorded in 67 HANSARD's DEBATES 714 (1843). A
vast literature has developed on the M1'Na.hten case and its aftermath. See, e.., .J. WEST & A. WALK,
DANIFt. McNAtGHTON: His TRIAL AND THE AFTERMATH (1977); N. WALKER, CRIIE AND INSANITY IN
ENGLAND (1968). The latter volume contains an excellent treatment of insanity and criminal law in
E nglind from 1100 until the mid-twentieth century. Even such issues as the correct spelling of
M'Naghten's name have been made the subject of scholarly articles. See Diamond, On the Spelling qf
Daniel .M'"Nahten's Name, 25 OHio L.J. 84 (1964).
19. M'Naghten's Case. 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 720.
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theory of criminal punishment. Finally, they were based on the
theories of.John Locke and the prevailing faculty psychology of the
day.
The M'Naghten insanity test determined criminal responsibility
by a moralistic analysis that assumed the existence of an objective
right and wrong. Insanity consisted of an inability to know the
difference. Long before the M'Naghten case English and American
judges had been using some kind of "right and wrong" rule to
determine insanity. When clergyman Francis Wharton, who wrote
America's greatest nineteenth century criminal law treatise, tried
to explain why lack of knowledge of right and wrong would excuse
from punishment, while mere lack of self-control would not, he
cited Saint Paul: "The good that I would I do not; but the evil
which I would not, that I do." Everyone has a problem of self-
control; that is part of humanity's plight in a sinful world. To make
such a weakness into a criminal defense, however, would be to
condone universal lawbreaking. The problem of mental disease was
not the person who could not act upon his moral discretion,
concluded Wharton, but the person who had no discretion. 22
A great deal of confusion existed, however, about what it
meant to say that an act was "wrong." The medieval Catholic
tradition had held that the real source of morals was external to
each individual. It lay in "authority," divine revelation as
interpreted by the Church. What was wrong was largely a question
of institutional definition. Laypersons who wanted to know
whether an act was sinful either asked their priests or looked at the
rules made by the State. As a result, in criminal cases in which the
insanity defense had been raised, many common law judges had
instructed juries that an act was "wrong" if it was contrary to the
law. Taken literally, that test meant that mere ignorance of the law
would excuse criminal behavior.
The Protestantism that developed first on the Continent and
then in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
gave people a much more personal and autonomous notion of right
and wrong. Scottish Common-Sense Realism, which grew up in
the eighteenth century and exercised a powerful influence on
orthodox British thought at the time M'Nahten was decided,
greatly expanded this idea of individual moral sensitivity. Scottish
22. 1 F. WHARTON AND M. STI.. MEDICAL,. ,JRISPURIENCE 130 (1873). For a tscinating
account of the development of the "right and wrong" test, sec.. Bwc;S.JR., liHi. GtILTY MIND 81(1955). Platt & Diamond. The onr'ins of the "Right and Wrongt - Test of Criminal Responsibility and its
Subsequent Development in the United States. An Historical Survey, 54 CAIF. I. REv. 1227 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Platt & Diamondl: Gunmacher, The Quest for a Test oj Criminal Responsihtilt, 110
Am..J. PSYcH. 428 (1954).
546
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Realists like Thomas Reid and Adam Smith believed that each
person's moral sense told him that certain actions were morally
wrong. By the 1840s the functions of the Anglican Church had
become largely formal. More than any time in Christian history the
Church taught that the ultimate authority of right and wrong lay in
each person's own heart. To describe something as "wrong" was
not merely to say that it violated the doctrines of the Church or the
laws of the State. What was wrong was something that violated
commonly held intuitions about absolute morality. The criminal
ignored his own conscience and, therefore, he deserved to be
punished. The mentally ill person lacked this internal ethical sense.
He had no standard by which to judge his actions.
The M'Naghten rules were also closely tied to the retributive
theory of criminal justice. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries many social philosophers were debating theories of
criminal punishment. Utilitarians and exponents of the contract
theory of government, like Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria
and English jurisprudent Jeremy Bentham, generally argued that
the most rational basis for punishment was deterrence. Under that
theory, criminals should be punished openly and without exception
so that the rest of society would see that breaking the social contract
had serious consequences. 21
However, other utilitarians, such as.John Stuart Mill, believed
that the deterrence theory was cruel. Followed to its logical
conclusion it mandated harsh and excruciating punishment, since
bloody torture would obviously have the greatest deterrent effect.
Against this, Mill suggested the much more humanitarian
"reformation" theory, that the purpose of punishment was to
rehabilitate the offender and return him to society a morally
healthy person.24
In contrast to the deterrence and reformation theories, most
nineteenth century common law jurists clung steadfastly to the
retributive theory of punishment that had always been an essential
part of the Christian moral tradition, although it had been given
new life by the great German Protestant philosopher Immanuel
Kant. Puniter quia Peccatum est. Under the retributive theory, an
act was punished simply because it was evil. The idea that all
23. See Geis, Jeremy Bentham, in PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY 36 (H. Mannheim ed. 1972).
Monachesi, Cesare Beccaria, in PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY 51 (H. Mannheim ed. 1972). For some
views on punishment by Americans of the period, see 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 37 (1881)
(Howe ed. 1963) (prevention is only pragmatically acceptable theory of punishment regardless of the
rationale the State claims to be using); M. PARMEILEE, CRI,tNOLOGY (1923); Wharton, Disputed
Questions ofCriminal Law, 4 S. L. REV. 238 (1879).
24. J.S. MILL, AN EXAMINATION OF SIR WILI AM HAIII-TON'S PHILOSOPHY 510 (1865). See W.
MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 121 (1968) (general discussion of rehabilitation theories).
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crimes were themselves moral wrongs that required a
commensurate punishment was irretrievably embedded in English
and American jurisprudence.
Kant had found the moral retribution theory implicit in a
philosophical notion of individual rights. Rights were claims that
individuals could make against society, even if their claims were
contrary to the best interests of the social group. Each right,
however, carried with it a parallel responsibility. Everyone was
held to those responsibilities, regardless of the best interests of
society. Part of one's right to own property was an obligation not to
steal the property of others. Part of one's right to live was a
responsibility not to kill. When the State protected people in their
rights and held them to their responsibilities it was respecting their
position as individual human beings. The theories of deterrence
and rehabilitation, however, were public policy theories according
to Kant. When the State punished for those reasons it had
subordinated the moral responsibility of the individual to the
general welfare of the State. Those rationales for punishment, said
Kant, treated human beings as means for increasing the general
welfare, but people had a right to be treated as ends in
themselves. 25
Within the context of this moral, individualistic theory of
punishment, the M'Naghten rules made sense. Above all else, the
retributive theory of punishment focused on individual moral
responsibility. The M'Naghten rules were not concerned about
whether the defendant could be cured of his disease and returned to
society mentally and morally sane. Nor were they concerned about
whether the punishment of a particular insane defendant would
deter others from similar crimes. They asked only one thing: Was
the person "responsible" for his act? That question placed all the
emphasis on an individual obligation, not on public policy. 26
Finally, the M'Naghten rules were based on the empirical
theory of .John Locke and the theories of psychology that were
variations of Locke's, especially faculty psychology.
The Lockean view of the mind was relatively simple. It was
predicated on the belief that the mind was nothing more than a
receptacle for ideas, and that "knowing" was its only function.
The Victorian notion that the mind might cause the body to
respond automatically and irrationally to certain stimuli, even in
healthy people, was not part of the psychiatric worldview of 1843.
25. IV Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, in GESAMMELTEN SCHRIFTEN 427-30(1913).
26. See F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW (10th ed. 1896).
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The justices in the M'Naghten case believed the mind was a
perceiver, not a creator, and any disease must be a malfunction of
perception. Neither did it occur to them, as it would decades later
to Freud, that everyone's mind contains a vast storehouse of
suppressed and hidden memories that surface at unexpected times.
In Locke's view the mind simply perceived external sensations and
converted them into "ideas," or knowledge. Then it used that
knowledge to tell the body how to respond. People even learned
moral values in this way. Within the Lockean paradigm, moral
statements were external, absolute, and "self-evident." Being able
to do what was right was entirely a problem of perception and
knowledge.2 7 One result of this Lockean view of the mind was that
English and American courts applied virtually the same rules in
cases of insanity, mental retardation, and infancy. All those
persons suffered from a common ailment: lack of a certain kind of
knowledge .28
Locke's idea that the human mind was nothing more than a
bundle of sensations dominated English and American thinking in
the eighteenth century. Faculty psychology, which was the
prevailing view of human psychology in the mid-nineteenth
century, was a more sophisticated variation of the Lockean theory.
Faculty psychology had become popular in England during
the early part of the century, largely through the work of Sir
William Hamilton, a Scottish Realist interpreter of Locke and
Kant. 29 According to Hamilton, human mental functions were
divided into three discrete "faculties": feeling, will, and intellect.
Each of these compartments was logically self-contained and
complete. Each analyzed external data separately and made its own
judgments and responses within its domain. 30
Distinct brain compartments raised the possibility that
mentally ill people could have what Francis Wharton called
"distinct insanities." ' 31 Although Wharton was a little skeptical
about the most extreme conclusions of the faculty theory, he
27. IV.). LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNIN. HUMAN UNDERSTANDING ch. 3 (1690). Locke believed that
while man cold have only "probable' knowledge in the empirical sciences, man could have
"certain" knowledge in roarhematics and morals. Id.
28. See Platt & Diamond, supra note 22, at 1227.
29. For a discussion ofthe works of Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), see B. KLEIN, A HISTORY
OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOL OGY: ITS ORIGINS AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDS (1970).
30. Id. Psychologists building on Hamilton's work even further subdivided the human brain.
For example, Alexander Bain, a Scottish psychologist who pioneered in the development of
empirical psychology, divided the faculty of intellect into perception, memory, conception,
abstraction, reason, judgment, and imagination. A. BAIN, MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE (1868).
Another group of mid-nineteenth ccntur' psychologists even went so far as to locate the physical
parts of the brain responsible for these functions. They made phrenology a popular pseudo-science
that almost achieved respectability. See.j. DAVIES, PHRE.NOLOGV FAD AND SCIENCE (1955).
31. Wharton, A Treatise on Mental Unsoundness, in MEDICAl JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1872)
[hereinafter cited as Wharton]
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concluded that a person could be insane in one compartment of his
mind but quite healthy in all the others. According to Wharton,
someone could have "insane perception, insane memory, insane
discrimination," or other kinds of partial insanity while the mind
as such continued to be sane. 32
Other faculty psychologists also classified mental diseases to
correspond to the faculties of the mind. James Prichard, an early
nineteenth century anthropologist and psychologist, developed the
concept of "moral insanity" to describe persons who had an
abstract awareness of right and wrong, but were compelled to do
certain things anyway. 33 Moral insanity, said Prichard, was
characterized by "madness, consisting in a morbid perversion of
the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral
dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable
disorder or defect of the interest or knowing and reasoning
faculties, and particularly without any insane illusion or
hallucinations." '3 4 Prichard found that most kleptomaniacs and
pyromaniacs knew quite well that their acts were wrong and they
could not explain why they were forced to do them. At unpredicted
moments, however, an "irresistible impulse" overcame them and
they committed the crime.3 5
The concepts of moral insanity and irresistible impulse created
a major anomaly in the Lockean paradigm. Implicit in them was an
admission that something other than knowledge influenced human
behavior.
.Jurists almost unanimously agreed that moral insanity
standing alone could not constitute a criminal defense. Some strict
Lockeans such as Francis Wharton, however, felt obliged to go one
step further. They denied the existence of moral insanity.
Wharton, like Hamilton, declared that the human mind consisted
of the three distinct parts of feeling, will, and intellect. However,
according to Wharton the mind could seldom operate exclusively in
any one of these three modes. For example, the pyromaniac
"selects the particular house by thought; applies the match with
thought .... ",36 His knowledge functions clearly participate in the
32. Id.
33... PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISEASES AFFECTING 1THE MIND 89 (1835)
[hereinafter cited as.1. PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY]. For a general history of the problem in
England, see Walker & McCuble, From Aloral Insanity to Psychopathy, in CRIME AND INSANITY IN
ENGLAND 205-22 (1972). See also.. PRICHARD, ON THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF INSANITY IN RELATION TO
.I'RISPRUDENCE, DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF PERSONS CONCERNED IN LEGAL QUESTIONS REGARDING
UNSOUNDNESSOF MIND(1842).
34..J. PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY, supra note 33, at 89.
35. Id.
36. Wliarton, supra note 3 1, at 149.
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commission of the crime, just as much as his moral functions. Such
a person could not be said to be insane. Either he did not know the
difference between right and wrong and he was mad, or he knew
the difference and was quite sane.
37
Such a simplistic analysis may have provided a consistent rule
for determining when criminal acts should be punished, but it
hardly explained the behavior of the pyromaniac. In order to do
that, psychologists would have to study human behavior from a
different perspective than .John Locke or William Hamilton had.
III. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY
Like all legal rules, the M'Naghten test was based on the
prevailing intellectual and scientific ideas of the times in which it
was created. During the nineteenth century, however, theories
about human psychology and psychiatry went through a broad
transformation that challenged the ideas of the M'Naghten judges
even before their opinion was issued.
Like other classical psychologies, that of .John Locke was
purely functional. It was interested in what appeared to be the
nonmaterial elements of human consciousness. Lockean
psychology always asked, "How does knowledge work?" It
reserved to the anatomists the more fundamental question, "How
does the human brain work?"
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, several
European physicians began to offer a broader set of theories about
the human mind. The new psychologists began experiments with
hypnotism that eventually opened up a huge field for psychiatric
research. Perhaps the biggest psychiatric discovery of the century
was that the mind stored a great deal of information of which its
owner was not even aware, and that people often responded to this
hidden knowledge in ways that the science of the day could only
describe as irrational.
The discovery of the unconscious so complicated the Lockean
paradigm that it became obsolete. The idea that people learned
things and acted upon them no longer conformed to the facts.
Under the developing paradigm, human motivation consisted of
two parts. The conscious part had always been plain to everyone,
but now there was something else. The idea that people could be
motivated by memories or perceptions they could not even recall
appeared to make the M'Naghten equation of knowledge and
37. Id.
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responsibility simplistic and cruel.
This new psychology made the explanation of human behavior
vastly more complex than any faculty psychologist had imagined.
Under the new paradigm, everyone, not merely the mentally ill or
the criminally insane, had an unconscious. Consequently, no one
could know precisely the factors that motivated his actions. 38
This new picture of human mental functions was a long time
in the making. In fact, a decade before the M'Naghten case was
decided some psychologists already believed that the right and
wrong test for criminal responsibility was much too simplistic to
describe human behavior accurately.
One of the greatest contemporary critics of the M'Naghten rule
was Isaac Ray, a medical doctor from Eastport, Maine. During his
early career, Ray became fascinated with mental disorders and
with the link between psychiatric and moral concepts of human
responsibility. Although he did not do extensive research with
living subjects, as Freud did a half century later, Ray did read
thousands of medical and legal reports about people whose criminal
behavior was obviously the product of mental disease. In the 1830s
Ray began classifying these cases. He tried to answer one question:
What kinds of mental disorders ought to relieve a criminal
defendant from responsibility for his crime? 39
Isaac Ray was not a great innovator in psychological theory,
and his work was clearly limited by the scientific model of his times.
Faculty psychology was implicit in his analysis: he believed that
intellectual insanity and moral insanity were distinct diseases. He
was a Lockean and thought that the only function of the brain was
to receive and organize data into knowledge.
However, Ray believed that the right and wrong test of
criminal responsibility was hopelessly out of step with the scientific
knowledge of his day. Knowledge, he thought, must be viewed as a
quantitative concept. Many judges instructed juries that only a
"complete alienation of reason" could relieve a defendant from
criminal responsibility. Obviously, argued Ray, no one but a
vegetable suffered from a complete lack of reason. On the contrary,
the most seriously ill criminal offenders showed a great deal of
reason, even in the preparation of their crimes. In the 1723 trial of
38. For a more detailed acecount of' tie rise of' modern psychiatry and psy,chology, see (;.
ALFANDIER & S. SE.ESNICK, HrSTOR OF PSYCIIIATRY (1966) H. ELLNrr rr.r, TiHE )rscOVFrv OF
THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE HISTORY AN) EVOLUTION OF DYNAMIC PSYCHIIArr (1970): E.. JONS. THE:
LIr, ANI \'ORK OF SIrMt t) FRFtVI) (1961): G. I.AtZI'N. SIMtI'Ni, FRFI)': TIIF. MAN ,,N, His
TlHEORIES (1962).
39. 1. RAY. A TREATSI ON THE. MEDICAL.JtI'SPRtI)ENCF OF INSANITY (1818) (Cambridge ed.
1962). SeeStearns, Bioqraphv ofssac Ray, 101 Asi..j. Psvcij. 573 (1945). See also O,.erholser, Isaac Ray,
in PIONEFRS IN CRtNUrNOLOcY (H. Mannheim ed. 1972).
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a man who shot at a British Lord while under the influence of an
insane delusion, for example, the judge made a great deal of the
fact that the defendant had planned his crime. He had bought shot
of a larger size than he ordinarily used for hunting and he had
carefully lain in wait for his victim. Mere evidence that there was
"something unaccountable" about a man's actions was no defense,
the judge instructed. In order to be acquitted by reason of insanity
the defendant must show that he "is totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing,
no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast." However,
the result of such a rule, argued Ray, was that "no man [could]
ever successfully plead insanity in the defense of a crime, because it
could be said of no one who would have occasion for such a defense
that he was unable in any case to distinguish right from wrong. "40
Ray came to some broad and challenging conclusions about
the insanity defense. He maintained that mental illnesses were
obviously of so many kinds and degrees that no single legal test
could identify them, especially not a test as simplistic as the right
and wrong rule. Further, any mental illness diminished human
responsibility, even for those who were able to verbalize an abstract
knowledge of right and wrong. Although moral insanity and
intellectual insanity were distinct diseases, each of them affected the
entire operation of the mind. "Nature has established a certain
adaptation of the moral and intellectual faculties to one another,
leading to that harmony of action which puts them in proper
relation to external things," wrote Ray, "and we can scarcely
conceive of any disturbance of their equilibrium, that will not more
or less impair the general result. "41
The discovery that the faculties of the mind are interdependent
led Ray to two conclusions. First, moral insanity ought to be a
defense, at least in certain cases. To be sure, the problem of the
morally insane is not that his abstract conceptions of the nature of
crime are at all modified. But that does not mean that the morally
insane person was responsible. Since the real character of his acts
were misconceived, he did not associate them with their ordinary
moral relations. The problem of the morally insane was not
knowledge, but perspective or control. Ray was outraged that
anyone should deny the existence of moral insanity. The literature
of both law and medicine was filled with a plethora of cases in which
40. RAY, supra note 39 at 13-31. The case Ray is discussing is Arnold's Case, 8 Hargrave, State
Trials from Henry IV to George Ill 332 (1776).
41. RAY, supra note 39, at 189, 190.
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people found themselves irresistibly impelled to commit criminal
acts even though fully conscious of the consequences and nature of
the acts. Ray knew that the situations involved in the cases
occurred in nature and were not fictitious inventions of the medical
profession.
Ray concluded that the general test of criminal responsibility
needed to be much more like the test in civil cases. In many
jurisdictions the civil rule was that wills, contracts, or other legal
instruments were binding only if the persons who made them were
of "sound mind." ' 42 In determining soundness of mind, courts
generally took a broad view of human responsibility and ruled that
a person could be held to his obligations only to a degree
commensurate with his mental capacity. .Juries were asked the
broad question whether the party was of sound mind, not the
narrower question whether he knew the difference between right
and wrong. Ray noted that under the test in civil cases, moral
insanity and partial insanity often furnished sufficient grounds for
invalidating civil acts, despite the apparent integrity of the
intellectual powers.
However, the civil law's "sound mind" test had become
involved in a number of logical and scientific problems of its own.
Most of these problems grew out of the propensity of judges to
devise a narrow legal definition of competency.
In the 1860s Ray began corresponding with .Justice Charles
Doe, a member of the Supreme.Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
Doe wanted to reform both the criminal and civil law.4 3 Around
that time, .Justice Doe was facing a case, Boardman v. Woodman, 44
which involved the mental capacity of an obviously insane woman,
Margaret Blydenburgh, to make a will. 45 In accordance with the
state rules of evidence the trial judge had refused to allow any of
Miss Blydenburgh's nonexpert acquaintances to testify about her
42. For the rules of non compos mentis in civil cases, see.j. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 130-34 (1st ed. London 1826). Like Ray, Holmes also argued that the tests in
the criminal law and the civil law ought to be the same, a logical conclusion from Holmes's premise
that the criminal law does not protect against "moral wrongs" but only against whatever wrongs
that State believed it had an interest in protecting its citizens from. See 0. W. HoLsiEs, THE COMtON
l.,A% 37 (Howe ed. 1963).43. See. REID. CHIEF JUSTICE: THE.JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE (1967) GUTTNtACHER,
The Quest.for a Test of Criminal Responsibility, Ill Am..1. PSYCH. 428 (1954); Kenison, Charles Doe, in
PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY 199-208 (H. Mannheim ed. 1972); Reid, A Speculative Novelty.Jude Doe's
Search for Reason in the Law of Evidence, B. L. REV. 321 (1959); Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire
Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 YALE L. .1. 367 (1960): Note, Doe of New Hampshire: Reflections on a
Nineteenth Century /udge, 63 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1950). See generally R. RIEBER &.1. VETTER, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL FOiuNDATION OF CRIMINAL LA\': HISTORICAl. PRESPFCTiVES ON FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY
(1978).
44. 47 N.H. 120(1866).
45. Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120 (1866).
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erratic behavior at the time the will had been made. Instead, he
admitted only the testimony of experts. Then the judge instructed
the jury in the inscrutable law of New Hampshire. If Miss
Blydenburgh had any kind of intellectual insanity at the time she
had made her will, it was invalid. If she had any kind of moral
insanity together with insane delusions, the will was also invalid.
However, if she had only moral insanity standing alone, then the
will was enforceable. The experts had found evidence only of moral
insanity and the jury had upheld the will. 46 The case was before the
Supreme.Judicial Court on appeal.
Sometime before December 1866, Isaac Ray wrote a letter to
.Justice Doe, telling Doe what he thought about the New
Hampshire rules. 7 .Justice Doe used the letter in a strong
dissenting opinion in Boardman that attacked both the criminal and
civil tests in New Hampshire and incidentally in almost every other
American and British jurisdiction. Doe found two things wrong
with the existing law. First, the determination of legal insanity was
too much a question of law, and too little a question of fact. Second,
the legal definitions of insanity were much too narrow and too
closely tied to outdated psychiatric theories. 48
It should be obvious, wrote .Justice Doe in his dissenting
opinion, that questions about whether someone had a particular
disease were preeminently questions of fact. For judges to talk
about a "legal definition" of heart disease or cholera would be
preposterous. Justice Doe declared that "insanity .. . is the result
of certain pathological conditions of the brain . . .and the tests and
symptoms of this disease are no more matters of law than are the
tests or symptoms of any other disease. . . . 49 Because the
existence of mental illness was a medical question it depended on
scientific analysis. As medical science advanced, the definitions of
such diseases changed. The law had to accommodate such changes
or else it would fall hopelessly behind the sciences. By fixing a
detailed legal definition of insanity, judges cut into stone what
should have been pliable and instrumental.
Of course, legal competency is a question of social
responsibility as much as it is about the existence of some mental
disease. Medicine alone may not tell us whether a mentally
defective person ought to be punished for his acts. For that reason
46. Id.
47. See Reik, The Doe-Ral, Corre.pondencrv .4 Pioneer Collahoration in the Jurisprudence o'Mental Disea e.
63 YA K I..J, 183 (1953).
48. lioardinan v. \Vooldnian, 47 N.H. at 147 ()io .., dissenting).
49. Id. ;i 148.
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Justice Doe believed that jurors should be permitted to listen to all
kinds of witnesses, not .just experts. People's daily experiences gave
them a strong and generally reliable sense of behavior and
responsibility according to Doe. In large part, questions about
insanity were questions about social standards, and those standards
determined who was responsible and who was not. Nonexpert
witnesses were generally acquaintances who had seen the subject
daily and had made life-situation evaluations of his behavior. When
they said that someone was acting in an irrational way they were
making an important value judgment that reflected public norms.
Their testimony was highly relevant to the thing that jurors ought
to be measuring: the defendant's functional responsibility.50
Doe believed that the worst problem of the existing law was
that by making insanity a question of law, courts had frozen legal
psychiatry in the Dark Ages. By this method "medical errors of
former days gained the sanction and the name of law by being
published in law books of high authority." .Justice Doe conceded
that the great virtue of the existing rules was their simplicity.
Everyone, both judge and jury, could comprehend the verbal
formulation of the right and wrong test in criminal cases. Scientific
definitions of insanity, on the other hand, were inevitably complex
and confusing. Furthermore, they changed from one day to the
next, and not even the experts agreed about them. But, Doe
argued, "[I1nnocent persons cannot be punished as criminals, nor
can property ... be disposed of by invalid writings, merely because
it is difficult for the court to give to the jury a scientific definition of
a pathological fact. ... ."" Even if for the sake of simplicity "the
law should entertain a single medical opinion concerning a single
disease, it is not necessary that that opinion should be a cast-off
theory of physicians of a former generation." ,52 To do this would
create a gap between law and science that would make the law a
fool. "That cannot be a fact in law, which is not a fact in science;
that cannot be health in law, which is disease in fact." ,5 3
Justice Doe concluded in Boardman that the trial .judge should
have given the jury one simple instruction about mental
competency: "The jury should have been instructed that if the
writing propounded in the probate court was the offspring of
mental disease, the verdict should be that Miss Blydenburgh was
not of sound mind." 5 4 Beyond that, Doe contended, juries should
50. /(/ at 144-46.
51. Id at 150.
52. Id
53. d
54. Id. at 148.
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have complete discretion to listen to all the witnesses and determine
competency for themselves. 55
Justice Doe sent Isaac Ray a copy of his dissenting opinion and
a long correspondence began between the two men. The early
letters reveal that .Justice Doe had tried to reform the law more than
even Issac Ray was prepared for. Ray was more concerned than
Justice Doe about the limitations of psychiatric science. He was a
little skeptical about Doe's headlong rush to make the legal rules for
determining insanity identical with the latest scientific definitions.
After all, courts had to consider ethical and social issues that the
sciences simply could not address. To the extent that the legal and
medical concepts of responsibility were different, perhaps there
could be a legal rule of insanity. Ray agreed completely that there
should not be a legal definition of what constituted mental disease.
However, the disease having been established, it might have been
perfectly proper for the law to formulate rules as to which kinds of
illness would excuse deviant behavior and which kinds would not.
"The law is 'just what the legislature chooses to make it," Ray
wrote to Doe in 1868, "and if it declared that 'insanity' or
'unsoundness' or 'incompetence' should be followed by certain
legal consequences, then would the court be going out of its
province to instruct the jury as to the meaning of these terms? '5 6
In 1869 Justice Doe first attacked the M'Naghten rules in a
criminal case. 5 7 He argued once again that the civil and criminal
tests ought to be the same. Josiah L. Pike had been convicted of a
brutal axe murder. His defense was that at the time of the crime he
had been suffering from "dipsomania," a loss of self-control caused
by severe alcoholism. The judge instructed the jury using the rule
.Justice Doe had suggested three years earlier, that there was no
legal test for insanity and that the jury must decide if the killing was
the offspring or product of mental disease. 58 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Doe stated that the M'Naghten test was "introduced
in an immature stage of science, in the dim light of earlier times,
and subsequently, upon more extensive observations and more
critical examinations, repudiated by the medical profession.'' 59
Because of that, Doe asserted that "the manifest imposture of an
55. Id. at 144-47. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court in
Durham recognizcd the merits of.justice Doe's insanity test and approved a modern version ol the
test. Id. at 874-75. The court stated that "an accused is not criminally responsible ifhis unlawful act
was the product of tental disease or mental defect. ' Id. See Sobeloff, From M'Nahten to Durham and
Beyond, 29 PSYCH. Q. 357 (1955).
56. Reik, supra note 47. at 191.
57. State v. Pike 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
58. Id. at 400-01 (1869).
59. Id. at 437 (Doe. c oncurring).
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extinct medical theory pretending to be legal authority, cannot
appeal for support to our reason or even to our sympathy. ",60 Doe
further stated:
It is often difficult to ascertain whether an individual had
a mental disease, and whether an act was the product of
that disease; but these difficulties arise from the nature of
the facts to be investigated, and not from the law; they are
practical difficulties to be solved by the jury, and not legal
difficulties for the court. 6 1
Justice Doe concluded that it would be unconscionable for criminal
courts to avoid modern scientific complexities by relying on the
harsh and primitive rules of an earlier day. 62
Justice Doe argued that the right and wrong test was so narrow
that not even M'Naghten himself would have been acquitted had
the test been properly applied. Eight experts had testified at
M'Naghten's trial that the defendant had been under the influence
of a morbid delusion which deprived him of the power of self-
control, but no expert had even discussed his ability to determine
abstractly the difference between right and wrong. Nevertheless,
the court found the medical testimony so strong that it "stopped the
trial and substantially directed the jury to acquit the defendant." 63
Justice Doe Argued that rigid application of the M'Naghten
rules would mean that no one but infants and the severely retarded
or psychotic could be acquitted. .Judges' and juries' own sense of
decency, however, frequently would not allow them to apply the
test that rigorously. In many cases of delusion or extreme loss of
self-control the court "found" a lack of knowledge where there was
no such evidence. The results were tragically arbitrary: acquittal
for M'Naghten, but conviction and execution for Frank Willard
sixty years later, even though the two men suffered from the same
illness.64
60. Id. at 438.
61. Id.
62. 1d. In 1870. Jsti e Doe tried the case of Hiram .]ones. who was accused of' nluin(li g i his
wife by slashing her throat with a razor. The deh'ndant pleaded insanity, and Justice Doe gave his
own new instruction to the jury which stated that the defeindant was not guily if the act was the
offspring or product of a mental disease. The delendant was convicted and appealed. In 1871 the
Supreme C Urt of New Hampshire. speaking through.justiee Ladd, approved Itie Doe formnulation
in the aice o la defense appeal that an even broader test ol insanity should have been i used: thai ih
defendant should have heen acquitted "if insaity iontributed to thie crimc. - tte S v..jtones, 5(1 N. H.
369, 375 (1871) (emphasis inl original).
63.49 N.H. at 439-
64. By the lite nineteenth century many jurisdictions hail developed a rather specific test lil"
delusion within the Al'N'a1hten rule. The test asked whether- the accuse Would have a valid dilinse' if
the delusion did in f lit exist. For example, if thi actused's dilusion was lihi ih( vicli to hid h ie
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The New Hampshire test espoused by.justice Doe evolved into'
a simple rule. First, experts testified about the presence or absence
of mental disease. The 'jury was then instructed to acquit the
defendant if they found that the crime was the "offspring or
product" of mental illness. The jury was therefore deciding two
issues: the medical question whether the disease existed, and the
social question whether the criminal act was a product of that
disease and would excuse the defendant from responsibility. This
formulation eventually satisfied Isaac Ray. He wrote to justice Doe
that "[the New Hampshire test] indicates a great advance beyond
the usual practice. . . . I suppose it will finally be accepted
everywhere, because I am sure it indicates the true spirit and
genius of the law, and is in accordance with the temper and habits
of our people." 6
5
Ray could not have been more wrong. The M'Naghten rules
were firmly embedded in American .jurisprudence. Fifty years later
the vast majority of states still used them and only a handful had
adopted anything else. In 1898 British criminologist Henry
Maudsley was flabbergasted and outraged that the great majority
of British and American courts could cling so tenaciously to such a
regressive and arbitrary rule. "Were the issue to be decided by
trying to kill him, then the accused could show that he did not know the act was wrong. He believed
he was acting in self defense. But if the delusion was merely that the victim was trying to interfere
with the accused's "secret mission," then there could be no defense because that would not have
been a defense even if the secret mission had been legitimate. Under this formulation. Willard was
properly convicted and M'Naghten probably should have been. See F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON
CRIMtINAL LAW 55 (10th ed. 1896).
Charles J. Guiteau failed this delusion test when he was convicted for the assassination of
President James A. Garfield in 1882. Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161, 187 (1882). Guiteau had the
delusion that Garfield was going to give him a high political appointment. and also that Garfield's
assassination was necessary to reunite the Republican Party. Id. at 174. Judge Cox instructed the
ury that it "would be simply monstrous" to acquit someone whose delusions were merely about
'the expediency and patriotic character of political assassination." Id.' at 175. Implicit in this
formulation of the delusion test was the notion that the defendant was "sane" except for his delusion.
The historical evidence in Guiteau's case, however, indicates that he probably would have been
convicted despite the evidence of insanity because prejudice and public opinion against him were
very strong. See C. ROSENBERe, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GuITEAIJ (1968); Halleck, American
Psychtatry and the Criminal. A Historic Review, 121 Am J. PSYCH. i-xxi (Supp. 1965).
In what probably has become his most famous criminal opinion,.Justice Cardozo dealt with the
delusion test in People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915). Schmidt had brutally
murdered a woman and dismembered her body. His plea was that he had insane delusions that God
had ordered him to comnmit the crime. Id. at 327, 110 N.E. at 945. The Judge instructed the Jury that
if the defendant knew that murder was illegal he should be convicted, even if the delusions were
genuine. On appeal. Justice Cardozo stated that the trial judge's instruction had been too narrow. If
Schmidt really believed that God had commanded him, then he also believed that he had a moral
obligation to commit the crime. That obligation would have overridden any knowledge that turder
was against the law. Id. at 340, 110 N.E. at 948. The legal test, said Cardozo, must look at the
fIctual issue of responsibility, and a person who believed he had a command from God was clearly
irresponsible, regardless of how much he knew about the law. Id. Nevertheless, Cardozo affirmed the
conviction because after the trial Schmidt admitted that he had been feigning insanity the whole
time. Id. at 343, 110 N.E. at 951.
65. Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence. A Pioneer Collaboration in the./urisprudence of Mental Disease, 63
YALE L.1. 183 (1953). Ray concluded that the Doe test was far superior to the A'NahIten rule because
it avoided all the questions about partial insanity and moral insanity. See Ray, The Law sflnsanitv, 4
Am. L. REv. 236(1869).
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tossing up a shilling, instead of by the grave procedure of a trial in
court," he wrote, "it could hardly be more uncertain.' '66
The American legal profession did not share Henry
Maudsley's view. In 1905 the late Francis Wharton's Medical
Jurisprudence was revised and brought up to date by legal editor
Frank Bowlby and forensic psychologist James Hendrie Lloyd, a
prominent neurologist at the Philadelphia Hospital. The new
treatise rejected the New Hampshire rule because "the question in
criminal cases is not insanity, but irresponsibility," and
responsibility is an ethical term. The question of criminal
responsibility is as much a question about social rules as about
medical science. Society must make people pay for their acts if they
"have intelligence and capacity to have a criminal intent and
purpose." Sometimes mental illness deprives people of this
capacity, but often it does not. 6
7
Ultimately, concluded the new Medical .Jurisprudence, criminal
responsibility must remain a question of law, to be decided by
judges and not by.juries or psychologists..Judges are "appointed by
the State as the guardians at once of the sovereignty of the law and
the liberty of the citizen." Their training and orthodoxy enables
the State "to establish a consistent system which the community
may take for its guidance." From the viewpoint of the law a
consistent formulation was much more important than something
that was scientifically up to date, especially in a science whose
concepts were widely debated and undergoing almost daily change.
.Judges must therefore reserve the authority to use the law to
determine "how much intellect, understanding, judgment, and
comprehension a man must have" to make him culpable. The
jury's only function is to decide whether the particular defendant
fits the.judge's test. 68
The legal arguments that Wharton's Medical Jurisprudence
levied against the New Hampshire rule never lost their impact.
Even when positivism in the social sciences was at its high point the
law never yielded much on the questions of mental competency and
human responsibility. The law and the mental sciences simply
looked at these issues from sharply different perspectives.
Positivism and Darwinism overran criminology in the late
nineteenth century. The new science of criminal behavior sought to
replace all the old categories of sin, guilt, retribution, and divine
66. H. MAIJDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAI, DISEASE (1898) (quoted in Rieber and Vetter.
supra note 43. at 117).
67. F. Wharton, NIEDICAI.JURISPRUDENCE 180-181 (1905).
68. Id.
560
INSANITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
purpose with a set of new, empirically verifiable concepts.
Victorian criminology itself became a sophisticated combination of
psychology, sociology, and physical anthropology; ethics and
religion were expressly excluded. The new criminologists were
convinced that if they could lay the criminal on their dissecting
table, probe his mind, and analyze his social experiences, they
could discover all the causes of crime. The new criminology
immediately challenged a premise that the law had accepted for a
long time: that there was a clear distinction between the "sane"
and the "insane" offender.
The new empiricism in criminology resulted in a rather
complete determinism, which quickly became the szarting point of
Progressive Era behaviorial theories. Social scientists found dozens
of things that contributed to criminal behavior, and almost all of
them were outside the control of the individual offender. Invariably
they were Darwinists and they used natural selection as a
foundation for various combinations of hereditary and
environmental determinism.
The father of the new positivistic criminology was Cesare
Lombroso, an Italian physician and mental hospital director who
devoted most of his life to studying the relationship between
phrenological characteristics and criminal behavior. From the
1860s until the end of the century, Lombroso performed autopsies
on the corpses of hundreds of criminals and examined thousands of
criminal skulls. He discovered that criminals had a much higher
incidence of cranial and facial abnormalities than occurred in the
noncriminal population. In 1887 Lombroso published the first
broad summary of his findings declaring that criminals had an
extraordinarily high incidence of poorly developed wisdom teeth,
small cranial capacity, flattening of the occipital, retreating
forehead, and other anomalies. 69
These data convinced Lombroso that most criminals were
biological throwbacks, individuals who for some reason had not
evolved as far as other members of their species. As a result of their
primitive mental capacities they were not able to compete with
other individuals within the structure that society had created.
Consequently, they had to resort to crime in order to survive.70
Lombroso's determinism was predominantly hereditary. He
believed that biological inferiority was the chief cause of crime.
Criminals were evolution's outcasts, not so deformed that they
69. I C. OI,R Boso, L' 1-10\,O1F (:RIMINFI. 155 (1887). For a lfs oaing analysis of Lonmbroso's
work. scv S. GoOo. THE MsIS\FASrUR OF MAN 123-43 (1981).
70. A)NIBROSO, supra now 69, at 157-58.
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could not survive at all, but sufficiently defective so that they could
not live normal lives. Invariably, like all Darwinists, Lombroso had
to deal with the role of the environment, since it determined the
extent of an individual's inherited strengths and weaknesses.
Lombroso found significant correlations between crime and
poverty. He concluded that a biologically inferior person who was
poor was substantially more likely to commit a crime than one who
was well off.1
One clear thesis emerged from Lombroso's work: individuals
were never responsible for their inherited defects and seldom
responsible for their environment. Within Lombroso's paradigm it
was not meaningful to think of criminals as "responsible" for their
acts.
In 1900 August Drahms, chaplain at the San Quentin prison
in California and a fervent student of Lombroso, published the
results of extensive cranial and facial measurements he had
conducted on 2,000 San Quentin inmates.72 Drahms distinguished
between the "instinctive criminal," who commited crimes no
matter how favorable his environment, and the "habitual
criminal," who had learned to live by crime because of adverse
circumstances.7 3 The primary causes of instinctive criminality,
were hereditary, concluded Drahms, while the chief causes of
habitual criminality were environmental. After elaborating on this
distinction, Drahms came to the same conclusion as Lombroso:
neither kind of criminal was responsible for his acts. One was born
without the advantage of those faculties that would enable him to
survive within society's rules. The other was thrown into a life
situation so adverse that only criminal behavior made survival
possible. 74
Social Darwinists like Lombroso and Drahms, who located the
causes of criminal behavior in heredity, were forced to conclude
71. LomiBROSO, supra note 69, at 157-58.
72. A. DRAHHMS, THE CRIMINAL (1900).
73. Id. at 144. Lombroso approved of DrIhni's distinction between habitual and instinctive
criminals. Lonibroso wrote the introduction to the first edition of l)rhhm 's work. See Lombroso,
Introduction to A. IRXtMS, Tt-E CRIMtNAL at xvii (1900). For a list of other studies of the relationship
between physical traits and criminal behavior. see J. MICtAEL & M. ADLER. CRitiE. LAW AND
SOCtAt SCIENCE (1933). A very faimous nineteenth century Anerican study of heredity and
criminality is R. DI'GDALE, THE ,JUKES: A STUDY IN CRIME, PAUPEitSM, DISEASE AND HRFDITY
(1877). Dugdale's study is about a New York fanmily that had a particularly high number of
olffenders. Dugdale found the causes in a host of hereditary diseases and deformities, coupled with
some undersirable environmental influences. By 1910 the work was clearly outdated, but the
publisher reissued it with an introduction by sociologist Franklin H. Giddings ti show how the newer
science had determined that the causes of crime were largely environmental rather than hereditarv.
Id See R. Di'(;DAI.l, THE JKES: A STUDY IN CRIME, PAi'PERISM. DISEASE AND HEREDITY (2d ed.
1910). For other important studies conducted in America during this period on the relationship of
heredity and criminality. see L. DONCASTER. HEREIrTY Ix THE LIcrT OF RECENT RESEARCH 165-66
(1910).
74. See L. DO NCASTER. HFREDrY I LiCirr oF REC-CT RCSEARCH 165-66 (1910).
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that not much could be done about the individual criminal. He
should probably be institutionalized in a simple environment that
would enable him to cope. Curing criminality was a problem
roughly akin to curing flat feet. Although Lombroso believed that
some criminals could be reformed and restored to society, the
criminal type was part of the natural order of things. Perhaps
society could attenuate his symptoms but it could never really solve
his problem. For most Social Darwinists this was an acceptable
conclusion.
In contrast to the Social Darwinists, Reform Darwinists never
accepted this resignation in the criminal's incorrigibility. By the
first decade of the twentieth century, Lombroso's phrenological
theories about the existence of a "criminal mind" were under
attack by both anthropologists and psychologists. 7 5 Ironically, just
as the science of genetics was beginning to come of age,
criminologists started to become rather thorough
environmentalists.
With the rise of evolutionary anthropology in the 1870s, a new
kind of environmental theory of criminal behavior had begun to
develop. Franklin H. Giddings, a Reform Darwinist, had
established sociology as a discipline at Columbia University in the
1890s. One of Giddings' proteges, Arthur Cleveland Hall, tried to
find a correlation between social evolution and criminal behavior.
75. For attacks on Lombroso's arguments, see C. GORING, THE ENGLISH CONVICT (1913); M.
SCHLAPP & E. SMITH, THE NEW CRIINOLOGY(1928).
In THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY, Schlapp and Smith rejected much of the genetic determinism
contained in the Lombroso school. Id. Ironically, in 1899 the vasectomy became a reliable, relatively
safe and inexpensive surgical procedure. Many states decided to take advantage of the cheap surgery
to sterilize criminals, using few procedural safeguards. During the period 1899-1907, Indiana
sterilized 465 criminals, an outrageously high proportion of those convicted of felonies in the state.
Between 1907 and 1926, 23 states enacted sterilization laws. Some of the laws were aimed at
criminals, but many were much broader statutes, part of the eugenics movement to improve future
generations through the sterilization of people whom the state had reason to believe were mentally
defective. For example, the Virginia statute upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in
1927 provided for the sterilization of the inmates of any state institution upon a finding that the
subject was "afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity [or) imbecility." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
206 (1927) (construing VA. CODE 5 1095h (1924)). The opinion by.justice Holmes has often been
used to quiet myths about Holmes's populism and liberalism, for in the opinion. Holmes uses some
quite illiberal language: "three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. In fact, however,
many of the most crusading progressive reformers were also staunch supporters of the eugenics
movement and believed that the eugenics movement was an essential part of comprehensive state
social planning. The procedural safeguards given to plaintiff Carraie Buck were not at issue in the
case: the only issue presented was whether the state had the right to compel Carrie Buck to submit to
the operation. Id. at 206. Holmes's opinion was quite consistent with the liberalism of his generation.
On the other hand, Justice Butler, one of the most conservative members of the Court, dissented
without opinion. Id. at 208 (Butlerj., dissenting).
The practice of sterilization came under strong attack in the early 1900s and began to subside in
the 1920s. See, e.g., A Protest Against Laws Authorizing the Sterilization qf Criminals and Imbeciles, 5.1. CRItM.
L.C. & P.S. 514 (1915). Hunter, The Sterilization of Criminals, 5.J. CRtt. L.C. & P.S. 499 (1915). An
interesting retrospective on the sterilization movement written after the movement substantially had
subsided is contained in P. DAVIES & F. WILLIAMS, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT 94-
120 (1930). See also H. CRAVENS, THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION: AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND THE
HEREDITY-ENVIRON,,ENT CONTROVERSY, 19001941 (1978); M. HALLER, EUGENIcs: HEREDITARIAN
ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1963).
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Evolutionists had been perplexed for some time by the fact
that while the process of natural selection seemed to make lower
species stronger and more aggressive, it did not have the same
effect on the human race. In fact, humanity seemed to be becoming
more pacifistic as time went along. Reformed Darwinists believed
this was so because, unlike the animals, men were evolving an
ethical system of social rules at the same time that they were
evolving physically. These rules, Hall argued in 1902, were as
much a product of natural selection as any physical characteristic
was. The rules that best contributed to the survival of the culture
were perpetuated, while others became extinct. In general, a
society maximized its chances of survival by minimizing internal
violence and friction. The "fittest" ethical rule was therefore the
one that best succeeded in preventing bloodshed and minimizing
individual resentment within the social group. The individuals who
had the best chance of survival in such a society were those who had
acquired a set of internal values most similar to the set that society
had accepted. Those not so fortunate became society's deviants. 76
Hall believed there were no ethical absolutes. What was
criminal at a particular time was defined by the state of society's
ethical evolution at that time. The ethical environment changed in
exactly the same way that the physical environment did. Society
evolved by continually excluding its ethically "inferior"
individuals. Hall argued that the production of crime and criminals
was one of the "saving processes of nature." According to Hall, if
nature had not induced within the group that "increasingly severe
'social selection and pressure toward the elevation of the individual
and the improvement of the type," mankind would have resorted
to another, inferior kind of evolution in which the most aggressive
individuals would have survived while the lovers of peace and order
would not have. Criminals defined society's ever increasing ethical
standards by failing to meet them. 77
Hall's criminology placed a much stronger emphasis on the
changing social environment as a cause of criminal behavior. This
switch to environmentalism accelerated rapidly when the writings
of Sigmund Freud began to influence criminology during the early
1900s. For Freud, the unconscious so dominated explanation of
human action that the key to almost every behavioral aberration lay
in some experience from the past.78 The secret to the most
76. A. HAl. CRIME IN Irrs RELATrION TO SOCIAL. 1'RoI;P ..s380-85 (1902).
77. Id at 385-86.
78. ,Se S. FRK ;I, THE PS'CHOPATHoI.OGoF E11.1 YrvY,v IHF (1901).
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important parts of anyone's past lay in the experiences of his early
childhood. At the same time, Freud was as opposed to metaphysics
as the hereditary determinists who preceeded him. He was
convinced that life was purely biological and that man did not have
a soul or any other nonmaterial organ. He believed that man had
no moral sense if "moral sense" meant some kind of perception of
a universal ethical standard. Instead, according to Freud, every
aspect of a person's conscious, including his moral values, was part
of a self-protection mechanism that man had developed through a
long process of natural selection. 7 9
William A. White, one of America's foremost Freudian
criminologists in the early 1900s, believed that social definitions of
crime were the product of both natural selection and of the
suppressed, selfish desires of individuals. 80 White was a close
follower of a theory that sociologist William Graham Sumner had
developed in 1906: that the most powerful elements in social
control were customs and instincts that a culture developed by
evolution over countless generations. 8' The State, said Sumner,
was generally powerless to change those attitudes that had evolved
into a part of "human nature." White located societal moral values
exclusively in these shared customs and instincts that had enabled a
particular social structure to survive and had therefore been
appropriated by its members as their "permanant values." White
thought the principle developed by Sumner was well illustrated by
the common law .jury. The jury trial, said White, was a "herd
critique" of one person's behavior by his peers. The .jurors came
from the society "in which the alleged crime was committed, and
their reaction to the crime was considered fairly to represent the
state of the popular mind regarding it." ,82
White maintained that the "herd critique" was a primitive
and irrational mechanism for judging human behavior. What was
really on trial was not the defendant's behavior but the suppressed
guilt of each juror. Every person's biological instincts inclined him
toward selfish aggression and violence. He would like to do what
the criminal actually did.8 3 Although the good citizen suppressed
those desires, the fact that he had them at all made him feel guilty.
By punishing the criminal, he reduced his own guilt. The criminal
79. See F. SUiLOWAY, FREUD, BioLOGIsT OF THE MIIND: BEYOND THE PSYCHOANALICi LEGEND
238 (1979).
80. W. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 18-19 (1923).
81. W. SUMNER, FOLKWAS (1906) (modern ed. 1960).
82. WHITE, supra note 80. at 204.
83. WHITE, supra note 80, at 19. White's argument is borrowed from lames George Frazer. a
British anthropologist whose book, The Golden Bough, was one of the most influential books of the late
1800s about the evolution of human culture. See]. FRAZER. il'E GOLDEN Bo'cm (1890).
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became the "handy scapegoat" upon whom each member of
society could transfer his feeling of his own tendency to sinfulness.
"[Tlhus by punishing the criminal [the.juror] . . . deludes himself
into a feeling of righteous indignation, thus bolstering up his own
self-respect and serving in this roundabout way, both to restrain
himself from like indulgences and to keep himself upon the path of
cultural progress. "84 The result was that the criminal was not
suffering for his own crimes at all, but for the pent-up guilt of a
repressed society. 85
This jury evaluation was especially cruel because the
criminal's behavior was beyond his control, said White. He was not
responsible for his acts. As a result, retributive.justice amounted to
nothing more than legalized torture of one member of society by a
group of his peers. This was where modern psychiatry became
involved. "Based upon a deterministic psychology," psychiatry
''sees any given act of an individual as an end result determined
and receiving its full explanation and meaning in the light of his
personality make-up as affected by environmental circumstances.)"
Unlike the jury system, psychiatry had a justifiable goal: the
solution of personality problems. In White's mind any mature legal
rule of criminal responsibility could likewise have only that goal.
White maintained that the theory of the treatment of crime
contained two objectives: "[first, to do away, so far as possible,
with the conditions (mental defectiveness, insanity, and immoral
social conditions, etc.) out of which crime grows; and second, the
salvaging of the criminal for social usefulness. "86
An important step in reforming criminology, White declared,
was to minimize the effects of the "herd critique." The criminal's
fate must be taken out of the hands of his peers and given to trained
professionals. White recommended that the jury role in criminal
trials be limited to the decision whether the defendant committed
the acts that constituted the crime. Any questions about his mental
condition, diminished capacity, ameliorating social conditions, or
about his punishment or treatment ought to be left to experts."7
In 1917 White saw many of his ideas incorporated in a
criminal responsibility statute proposed by the American Institute
of Criminal Law. The committee that proposed the new statute
84. WHITE, supra note 80, at 13 (footnote omitted).
85. WHITE, supra note 80, at 13.
86. WHITE, supra note 80, at 229.
87. See 4.J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 6, 106 (1913) (discussing White's view of jury role limitation on
the issue of insanity). White later modified his views and concluded that Juries could determine the
issue of insanity in some circumstances, provided that they were guided by suitable medical
standards. See WHITE, supra note 80, at 142-43.
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was the first of its kind, composed of five lawyers and four medical
doctors and designed to reflect both good legal principles and sound
science. The proposed statute's insanity test resembled a
combination of .Judge Doe's New Hampshire rule and the
traditional civil test of mental competency. In order to be acquitted
by reason of insanity, a defendant had to show that "he was
suffering from mental disease and by reason of such mental disease
he did not have the particular state of mind that must accompany
such act or omission in order to constitute the crime charged. "88
However, the most radical part of the proposed statute was not
its responsibility test but a new, special verdict of "not guilty by
reason of insanity." Someone acquitted by this verdict would
remain in the State's custody for a hearing to determine his
continuing danger to society. If a judge determined that the
defendant was still a threat to the public, then the State must have
him committed until he became well. Historically, the common law
knew only two criminal verdicts, guilty and not guilty. Once
acquitted because of his insanity, a prisoner was entitled to go free
unless a new hearing was immediately scheduled to have him civilly
committed.8 9 As a result, many prisoners, often terribly ill, were
freed and frequently committed the same crimes again. By
committing such individuals, the statute would have solved a
problem that had plagued many states during the nineteenth
century.
The proposed statute also created a special standard for
persons of "diminished capacity," who could be considered only
partially responsible. Under the Institute's proposal, persons whose
mental disorder was not enough to earn them an acquittal could
instead be convicted of a lesser offense commensurate with the
amount of responsibility they were thought to have. In 1917 most
states still clung to the "either-or" rule: the defendant was either
sane and must be convicted of the crime with which he was
originally charged, or else he was insane and entitled to acquittal. 90
88. The proposed statute is discussed in Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARV. L.
REV. 535, 724 (1917). See 0. W. H(tLM ES, TI'Mi COMMON LAW 87-88 (Howe ed. 1963). See also
Keedy. T sts ofCriminal Responsibilit), qthe Insane, 1]J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 394 (1910).
89. However, )aniel M'Naghten was sent to Bethiam Hospital for the insane after his acquittal
in 1843. See Allderidge, Why was McNaghten Sent to Bethlam?, in DANIEL MCNAGHTEN: His TRIAL AND
THE AFTERMATH 100(1977).
90. For the "either-or" position, see Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141, 145 (1883). "[Tihere is, in our
state, nit middle grounti between 'sanity' and 'insanity.' " Id. See also Kirby v. State, 68 Tex. Crim.
63, 15ff S.W. 455 (1912).
In United States v. Lee. 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 489 (1886), the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia rejected the notion of diminished capacity as a defense in a murder case. Id. at 496. In Lee
the trial judge had instructed the jury that they could find that the defendant had insufficient mental
capacity to c(mmlit premeditated murder, fut sufficient capacity to commit manslaughter. Id. The
court in Lee stated that "there can be no recognition of the doctrine that a man is incapable of
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The proposed statute of the American Institute of Criminal
Law attempted to make a radical change in American attitudes
toward the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill. While greatly
increasing the number of defendants who could take advantage of
the insanity plea, it also increased the State's discretion to
determine how such people should be treated. Theoretically, no
offender would be returned to society until he was mentally
healthy. 9 '
Hardly a state adopted any of the Institute's
recommendations. The law simply clung to too many ethical values
that naturalistic psychiatry wanted to eliminate. The law refused to
divest itself of the idea that society's standards incorporated an
absolute morality and must recognize absolute evils that had to be
punished. When the State put someone on trial for a crime it
wanted more than simply to find out what kind of treatment was in
the defendant's best interest. It wanted something that empirical
distinguishing between right and wrong so as to determine that the case is not a case of nurder, and
yet capable of distinguishing between right and wrong so as to be guilty of manslaughter. There is no
such doctrine. and nothing in the book favors any such ideas.' Id.
However. by the 1920s some states began to recognize that different degrees of mental capacity
could yield different kinds of convictions. Most courts handled the issue by violating the rule
articulated in Lee. United States v. Lee, 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) at 496. Courts held that defendants with
diminished capacity could not formulate the requisite "intent" to commit certain crimes. For
example, many states recognized a class of homicides involving an intent to kill as "murder," while
recognizing homicides when no such intent to kill wias present as "manslaughter." Manslaughter
was a substantially less serious crime than nmurder because it saved the defendant from the death
penalty. Manslaughter statutes and manslaugher at contmon law both originally had been designed
to account fbr homicides committed by persons who were negligent or reckless and killed someone as
a resut. but who never "intended' to kill anyone. After 1920. however, many state courts
increasingly began to convict mentally ill defendants of' manslaughter, even though the facts of the
case were more consistent with premeditated murder as, for example, the facts in M'Naghten's
Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Some states developed rather elaborate classification systems that
explicitly took diminished capacity into account. New York, for example, developed four degrees of
homicide: two degrees of murder, and two degrees of manslaughter. Whether a defendant could be
convicted of a certain degree of manslaughter or murder depended on the defendant's mental state at
the titie the crime was committed. See GILBERT's CRsInNA_ CODE § 1220 (1923). Discussing
intoxicatio and ctdiminished capacity as a defense. section 1220 states that "[wiheneser the actual
existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular
species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was
intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the
act." Id.
In Stenzel v. United States. 261 F. 161 (8th Cir. 1919), the defendant was indicted under the
Espionage Act. Id. at 162. The appellate court concluded that there was "distinct and positive
evidence that Stenzel was so drunk . . . that he did not know what he was saying .. [H]e was
entitled to have the jury pass upon the question of whether or not he was at the time so drunk that he
was incapable of entertaining the specific criminal intent required by the Espionage Act.'' Id. at 163.
The decision in Stenzel became a landmark determinant for later cases in which the defense of
diminished capacity was presented. See Crothers. Criminology from Alcoholism, 4.1. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
859 (1914). Like the court in Stenzel, the Supreme Court of Utah was presented with the purported
defense of liminished capacity in State v. Ansehno. 46 Utah 137. 148 P. 1071 (1915). The court in
Anselmo recognized the defense of diminished capacity because "al person's mental condition may
not be such as to make him irresponsible for his acts, and yet it ntay be such as to relieve him frot
the extreme penalty imposed by law for the committed act.'" Id. at 157, 148 P. at 1078-79.
Scotland has recognized the defense of diminished capacity since 1867. See S. GLEcK, LAw AND
PSYCHIATRY 24 (1962). The first argument presented in England fbr the recognition of' the defense
waits in 1883. See 2.1. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRtSMINAL. LAW OF ENGLAND 175 (1883). See also H.
,'IAt'DSI.EN. RESPONSI Biit-rY AND MENTAl DISEASE(1897).
91. See Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARV. L. REV, 535 (1917).
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science could not justify, that it perhaps could not even describe. 92
IV. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND THE OLD LAW
Even the psychiatrists occasionally admitted that they had not
succeeded in turning every ethical question into a behavioral one.
Carl Jung parted company with Sigmund Freud in 1914, partly
because he found some of Freud's positivistic and antireligious
biases narrow and naive. "[B]ehind the confused deceptive
intricacies of neurotic phantasies," he wrote, "there stands a
conflict which may be best described as a moral one. 93 .jung spent
the rest of his career studying that conflict, becoming increasingly
convinced that religious values played a large and essential part in
the human conscience. In Freud's paradigm, however, the moral
conflict was only a mirage, something that hid nothing more than
fears and the suppressed anxieties of early youth. Freud's reasoning
was simple enough. Only two "inputs" into man's physical and
mental make-up could be empirically verified and measured.
Granted, psychology and psychiatry had not yet been able to
explain every aspect of human behavior in hereditary or
environmental terms. However, that is merely a function of the
current state of the science. For psychiatry to admit a third, non-
empirical source, would be no different than the caveman's
deification of lightning simply because he did not yet understand
the laws of physics. For the social scientist the exclusion of non-
empirical explanations of human behavior was an essential matter
of procedure. Entertain only that which can be verified and science
remains science. Admit anything else and it rapidly becomes
metaphysics. Nevertheless, by the 1930s many intellectuals were
suggesting that even the social sciences had their limits - that even
the most scrutinizing psychoanalyst could not discover some
sources of human consciousness and motivation. When that
92. In I WHARTON'S CRIMINAl LAW 72 (1932), the authors concluded that "there has scarcely
been a case in any state which has repudiated the M'Naghten rule." Two years later, Dean Miller of
the Duke University School of Law reached the same conclusion. See.J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 126 (1934). See also I W. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME 277 (1946) (citing New
Hampshire and Rhode Island as possible exceptions to majority of jurisdictions acceptingM'Naqhten
rule); K. SEARS & H. WEIHOFEN, MAY'S LAW OF CRIMtFS 48 (1938) (citing majority of jurisdictions
that had accepted M'Naghten rule); H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956) (29 states adopting
M'Naghten rule); Hall, Responsibility and the Law, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956).
By 1938, however, about one-third of the states recognized the defense of "irresistible impulse"
as an exception to the M'a'hten rule. See I W. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME 284 (1946); S. GLuECK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIIINAL LAW 227 (1925); K. SEARS & H. WEIHOFEN, MAY'S LAW OF
CRIMES 49 (1938).
93. Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 COLU.M. L. REV. 677, 713 n.178 (1945)
(quoting. ItUNG, ANAL YTICAL PSYCHOI.OGy 242 (trans. Long 1922). See P. Roazen, FREUD AND His
FOLLOWERS 242 (1971).
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happened, traditional morality experienced a new rise in
popularity. 94
The law had additional empirical justifications for its refusal to
accept everything psychiatry offered. For all its positivism and self-
confidence, the psychiatry of the Progressive Era was a highly
speculative, inexact science. Furthermore, the discipline was
riddled with internal conflicts and anomalies. 95 Psychology and
psychiatry needed a more united front if they were going to have a
broad effect on any discipline as conservative and as protective of
its values as the law.
Mental science appeared most speculative and divided on the
issue of human freedom. The battle between the genetic
determinists and the environmentalists continued through the
twenties. Jurists, however, generally stood to the side, looking on
with some bewilderment and a good deal of skepticism. The law
required in a most fundamental way that people be held
accountable for their actions. Even the most deterministic
societies, such as.John Calvin's sixteenth century Geneva or.John
Winthrop's seventeenth century Massachusetts, found it essential
to believe that criminals were responsible for their crimes. 96
Furthermore, psychiatry had not done a very good job of
either defining or defending its notion of responsibility. In 1924
Sheldon Glueck, a Harvard student who would become one of the
country's foremost criminal psychologists, found that the discipline
had deeply involved itself in a metaphysical debate about
determinism and individual responsibility. 97 Glueck found that
Freudian psychologists were using arguments similar to those
Jonathan Edwards had used two centuries earlier.
"Responsibility" was itself a metaphysical term if one thought he
must discover it in nature. "In this respect," Glueck concluded,
''conservative law had shown herself much more sensible than her
more impetuous sisters, the experimental sciences." While
psychology and psychiatry had immersed themselves in giant
questions about ultimate causation, law "takes the common sense
view that this need not at all affect our practical belief in human
freedom. "98 Even orthodox criminal lawyer Francis Wharton had
94. See E. PURCElI ..1R., THE CRISIS OF DEtOCRATIC. THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE
PROILEM OF VAUIF., 45 & 180 (1973).
95. 1Linguistic analyst C.K. Ogden surveyed psychology in thet mid-twcntits and detcrminCd
that it asvOtuld be "gratuitous I[ O t l )rtend that psvcholgists as a body are agreeid on many luidamnial
issU .'' . OGDEN, THE MEANING OF PSNCHOI.OI;Y preface '. xx (1926).
96. K. ERIKSON, \VAYW 5ARI) PURI]IANs: A S , I IS IN THE Socioi.O(;Y )F I A)sIXNCI.E (1966).
97. Glueck, Fthio, Psvcholot), and the Criminal Rr'sponibilit, of the Insane, 58 A, I.. Riv. 641
(1924).
98. Id. at 660.
570
INSANITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
been more pragmatic than the social scientists. The controversy
over free will, Wharton had written in his treatise on criminal law,
was simply "not a part of criminal theory." He was willing to
concede that "from a speculative point of vision, all acts are
necessitated. With this, however, jurisprudence, which is a
practical science, has nothing to do." Wharton believed that in
some practical contexts arguments from determinism must simply
be set aside, not because the problems had been solved, but because
they never could be and the law could not afford to deal with
them. 99
Victorian criminology was guilty of a giant equivocation. It
confused the absolute "responsibility" of determinism with the
much more pragmatic and relative "responsibility" that juries
decided in insanity cases. Arguments from responsibility as the
Lombrosians and Freudians used them proved far too much. They
argued not merely that the mentally ill were not responsible for
their acts, but that no one was responsible for anything. Followed to
that conclusion psychiatry would have emptied our prisons. Law
had to deal with the much more limited, but also more empirical,
question of relative responsibility. If the State could have any kind
of mechanism at all for determining that some people must be
imprisoned for their crimes, while others must be hospitalized or
released, it had to show that in some measurable sense the people
in the latter group had less control over their actions than those in
the former. To talk about whether humanity was genetically or
environmentally determined did nothing except obfuscate the
issues. Glueck concluded:
Our notion of moral responsibility is not necessarily
dependent upon our views as to the metaphysical
problems of human freedom. . . . Men condemn and
forgive each other . . . not necessarily because of any
belief in human freedom [but because] their intelligence
and experience teaches them that most human beings
have some capacity for purposive, creative activity. ...
When men fail to achieve the socially or legally acceptable
minimum of required conduct, it is either because they
deliberately chose such a result, or because, through
native mental defect, mental disease, or the
overwhelming pressure of the external world, they were
actually unable to exercise their purposive-volitional
capacity. 100
99. 1. WHARTON. IREATISF ON CRIMINAL LAw 49 (10(h ed. 1896).
100. S. GI UECK, MENTAI. DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 93-95 (1925). Clarence Darrow
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As difficult as the task was, Glueck concluded, the law had the
obligation to discover which of those causes controlled a specific
offense. 101
If the environmental determinists had shown anything, it was
that if man as an individual was a product of his environment, man
in society could control that environment and modify behavior.
German criminologist Gustav Aschaffenburg observed in 1903 that
people responded to artificial changes in their environment as
much as to natural ones. 102 He determined that "The stamping of
an act as an offense the commission of which the state will prosecute
with unrelenting severity, immediately arouses the feeling that the
act is unsuitable, inadmissible, disrespectable, contrary to
duty. "103 Aschaffenburg concluded that when the experience of
someone else's punishment for an act became part of a person's
view of the world, his own environment would change and he
would cease to commit the act.10 4 Canadian Judge Riddell put it
into more colloquial form in 1908 when he instructed a jury in the
doctrine of irresistible impulse: "The law says to men who are
afflicted with irresistible impulses, 'If you cannot resist an impulse
in any other way we will hang a rope in front of your eyes and
perhaps that will help.' 105 Michigan law professor.John Barker
Waite declared in 1925 that even the absolute determinist
acknowledged that a controlled environment yielded controlled
behavior. 10 6 Waite stated: "By punishment of one person... there
are created in other brains impressions which tend to prevent the
translation of impulse into particular action. '"107 The general
deterrence theory of criminal punishment, noted Waite, was
predicated upon a kind of environmental determinism. An
environment in which people were punished for committing crimes
was, after all, quite different from an environment in which they
were not.
Waite accepted the belief of his day that retribution was not a
proper goal of criminal punishment. But then he added that the
used determinism to conclude that no criminal is responsible for his or her behavior. According to
Darrow. criminals should be "treated" rather than punished. Darrow asserted that in each case the
State has a duty to determine what kind of treatment would be in the best interest of the defendant.
C. DARROW, CRIME: ITS CAUSE AND TREATMENT (1922). See R. MCCONNELL, CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINT (1912) (advocating "determinism" to establish
responsibility for criminal behavior). But see M. PARMELEE, CRIMINOLOGY (1923) (a more pragmatic
and less metaphysical approach for determining criminal culpability).
101. S. GLUECK, MENTAl DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 89 (1925).
102. G. ASCHAFFENBIIRC, CRIME AND ITS REPRESSION 262 (1913).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The King v. Creighton, 14 Can. Crim. Cases 349 (1908).
106. Waite, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Liability, 23 MICH. L. RiFv. 443, 450(1925).
107. Id. at 451.
INSANITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
M'Naghten test was reasonable even for those who accepted only the
deterrence theory of punishment. People suffering from irresistible
impulse or partial insanity could at least arguably be deterred by
the proper kinds of environmental engineering. People who did not
know what they were doing, however, could not be. With that
rationale, Waite argued that the orthodox form of the M'Naghten
rule should be the law. 
108
Finally, the law recognized that psychiatry had a unique
weakness that seriously called into question many of its conclusions
about mental illness and criminal responsibility. Psychiatrists,
psychoanalysts in particular, could not examine human minds
directly, the way botanists examined ferns. The psychoanalyst's
data were human actions, especially human language. Frequently,
his only empirical evidence about human motivation was what his
subjects told him. Many Freudians discounted the problem,
believing that hypnosis and psychoanalysis could break down every
inhibition so that a patient's words could be an accurate description
of his state of mind. But that theory was itself unverifiable, for in
the final analysis the psychiatrist could not get behind the words.
Psychologist Thomas Vernor Moore wrote: "It is impossible to
investigate everything in our mental life by objective methods, for
this inner experience is far richer than its manifestations by actions
or reactions that can be the objects of an external observer's
experience.' ' 0 9 The answer for Moore and many of the
psychologists of the late twenties and thirties was that psychology
must develop a new awareness of its own limitations. Part of the
explanation of human behavior would always lie beyond its
empirical reach. William James had suggested one solution a
generation earlier, that psychologists look inward, applying their
observational techniques to their own streams of consciousness. 110
Although that suggestion may have been useful for solving some
problems, it was little help to those trying to understand the minds
of the mentally ill.
The simplest questions, such as whether irresistible impulses
were really irresistible, so enmeshed psychiatrists in metaphysical
and linguistic problems that the law was necessarily unimpressed.
For the determinists all impulses were irresistible. Defense lawyers
were quick to pick up the implications of that. When Lawrence
Hight was accused in 1924 of murdering his wife so that he could
live with another woman, the defense of irresistible impulse was
108. I. a( 470-71.
109. T M1OOR, I) NAMIC PsYc:Ho :OCv Y9 (1924).
1 WAL IW,..JAN IFS. T[IF.lI) lIlNC[ llEbS OF P's'c I olxlo;y 185 (1890).
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obvious to Clarence Darrow. "It was simply a case," he told
reporters, "where primitive instincts were too strong for the
inhibitions.'''1'
For those with more pragmatic standards, the solutions did not
come so easily. By 1924 psychiatrists had examined hundreds of
persons suffering from irresistible impulse, but University of
Illinois psychiatrist H. Douglas Singer and psychologist William
Krohn concluded that, at best, the phenomenon was "little
understood. 11 2 Even if the theory of irresistible impulse was
correct, it was almost impossible to be certain that a particular case
was legitimate. John Barker Waite concluded that legitimate cases
of irresistible impulse were extremely rare, even though the defense
was often raised." 3 Furthermore, said Waite, psychiatrists had
only a minimal understanding of the disease and could almost
never measure the degree to which a particular individual's will has
been affected. Waite concluded that, the psychiatrists
notwithstanding, the law must reject the irresistible impulse
defense. 114
V. CONCLUSION
The standoff between psychiatry and jurisprudence survived
the end of the New Deal. There was never any inevitability that the
science of mind would transform the law. Before that could happen
the law needed to perceive clearer, more unified and convincing
theories from the scientists themselves. Ironically, the law also
needed to wait until people like Glueck, Moore, Singer, and Krohn
qualified their own high views of their discipline.
Progressive Era and psychologists of the 1920s believed they
were replacing religion and myth with empirical fact. For .jurists,
however, there was no such easy dichotomy. .Judges and lawyers
perceived that human behavior contained a complexity, even a
moral content, that the scientists refused to acknowledge. Rather
than .jump from one scientific fancy to the next, .jurists insisted that
science had not yet crossed some boundaries, and they continued to
If1 I. l)'roit Free Press. Sept. 29. 1924. at 15. col. .
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k iii aimeI that the dclnsc of 'irresis lle impulse" could be established in criminal cases.
l ,1h ~l, r xtaloinarily areful examination prowedures. Above all. warned (Glu'ck. thre should
iiu' I - Io t [, ii-rusistibit- impulse. Thw jury should Ie allowed to listen to the i'xperts andI make
its (lcision . iti as little direction as possible. S. GixtFcK, MENTAt. DtSORDER ,AJ, rE CRIMINAl
LAW 1 17 ( 1'25
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apply the old rules, always creating the exceptions and
modifications that their ever-changing ethical sensibilities
demanded. They perceived, of course, that this method was not the
best science. But they believed as well that there would probably
never be a scientific way to determine who should be made to
answer for his criminal acts.

